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Abstract
We study axiomatically situations in which the society agrees to treat
voters with diﬀerent characteristics distinctly. In this setting, we pro-
pose a set of intuitive axioms and show that they jointly characterize
a new class of voting procedures, called Type–weighted Approval Vot-
ing. According to this family, each voter has a strictly positive and
ﬁnite weight (the weight is necessarily the same for all voters with the
same characteristics) and the alternative with the highest number of
weighted votes is elected. The implemented voting procedure reduces
to Approval Voting in case all voters are identical or the procedure
assigns the same weight to all types. Using this idea, we also obtain
a new characterization of Approval Voting.
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Motivation There are many instances in which the members of a society or
an institution vote in order to take a decision and each voter’s impact on the
outcome depends on her/his underlying characteristics. Examples include
the EU Member Council or the IMF Board of Directors, where the weight
of a country is determined by its population size or its stake, respectively
(see, Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix); management boards, where the vote
of the CEO tends to count double in case of a tie; or hiring decisions in
academic institutions, where the opinion of senior members is usually given
more weight. From a theoretical point of view, this implies that voters are not
treated equally and that existing axiomatic results on the question of which
voting procedure to implement do not directly apply. It is consequently the
aim of this study to complement the existing literature on axiomatic voting
theory by suggesting a general class of voting procedures that is able to cover
these kinds of situations.
The aggregation procedures discussed in the literature diﬀer essentially
in the type of information they take into account from the individual prefer-
ences. For example, Plurality Voting, the most widely used voting procedure,
allows each individual to indicate only her most preferred alternative (and
the alternative with most votes is elected). One common critique of Plurality
Voting is that it may actually result in the election of the worst alternative
for a majority of individuals even in single–winner elections. As a simple
example, consider the case when there are three alternatives, two of which
are very similar. Then, if the votes for the two similar alternatives are dis-
tributed equally, the third alternative may be elected even though a majority
of the voters would prefer either of the other two alternatives.
Approval Voting, introduced by Brams and Fishburn (1978), has been ex-
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plicitly designed to overcome this drawback of Plurality Voting by allowing
individuals to vote for (or approve of) as many alternatives as they wish to.
As usual, the alternative with most votes wins the election. Recent evidence
from ﬁeld experiments by Laslier and van der Straten (2008) in France and
Alo´s–Ferrer and Granic´ (2011) in Germany has shown that Approval Voting
modiﬁes the overall ranking of the alternatives and that it tends to elect the
alternative that is most widely accepted in the population. This is the main
reason why we deviate from using Plurality Voting as a benchmark and frame
our analysis in the (more general and more complex) context when individ-
uals can approve any number of alternatives.
Characterizations We are interested in general voting procedures that are
operable in diﬀerent voting environments in which the set of voters and the
set of alternatives might vary. In particular, given a population of potential
voters and a conceivable set of alternatives, a voting procedure should specify
an outcome (a non-empty subset of the set of feasible alternatives) for every
electorate (the individuals that indeed vote) and every set of feasible alterna-
tives (the alternatives actually standing for election). We also assume that
voters are partitioned into types according to some exogenous characteristics
in such a way that individuals with equally relevant characteristics belong
to the same type. In the examples of indirect democracy mentioned earlier,
one can think of classifying voters into types in function of the number of
people or the stake the voter represents. In problems of decision making in
small groups, the voter’s type could be associated with some of her personal
characteristics such as seniority, age, etc.
In this setting, we consider a set of intuitive properties. First, we in-
troduce two consistency properties that impose some structure on how the
result of the voting procedure should be adapted when the set of alternatives
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or the set of individuals change: Consistency in alternatives, which is the
analogue of Arrow’s Choice Axiom, states that if the set of feasible alterna-
tives is reduced yet some of the originally elected alternatives remain feasible,
then exactly those alternatives have to be elected in the new situation; and
Consistency in voters, which requires that if two disjoint electorates select a
common set out of two feasible alternatives, then exactly this set has to be
elected when the two electorates are assembled. Afterwards, we consider two
symmetry properties: Symmetry across types, which means that voters of
the same type have to be treated equally; and Symmetry across alternatives,
which is the classical neutrality property. Finally, we add two well-known
conditions: Faithfulness, which asks that if there is a single voter who ap-
proves 푥 but not 푦, then 푥 has to be elected whenever 푥 and 푦 are the only two
feasible alternatives; and Continuity which, roughly speaking, states that no
group of individuals should be able to always impose completely its opinion
on the result of an election when joint with a suﬃciently large electorate
formed by many subgroups that agree among them on the set of alternatives
that has to be selected.
Our ﬁrst result, Theorem 1, shows that these properties fully characterize
a general class of voting procedures that we will call Type–weighted Approval
Voting. Each voting procedure of this family is associated with a vector of
strictly positive and ﬁnite weights, one for each type of voter, and the win-
ning alternative is the one with the highest number of weighted votes. If
no discrimination across types have sense in a particular context, all weights
should be equal and the voting procedure reduces to Approval Voting. Ex-
ploiting this fact, we show in our second result, Theorem 2, that if Symmetry
across types is strengthened to the classical condition of Anonymity (Symme-
try across voters), one essentially obtains a new characterization of Approval
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Voting in which Faithfulness and Continuity are eliminated as necessary re-
quirements.
Related Literature Our work contributes to the existing literature on ax-
iomatic voting theory. Roberts (1991) was the ﬁrst to characterize Plurality
Voting. Richelson (1978), Ching (1996), and Yeh (2008) also characterize
the Plurality Rule, but as a social choice correspondence and not as a voting
procedure; that is, in these studies, the domain is the Cartesian product of all
linear orders on the set of alternatives. Fishburn (1978, 1979), Sertel (1988),
Baigent and Xu (1991), Goodin and List (2006), Vorsatz (2007) and Sato
(2013) provide diﬀerent characterizations of Approval Voting. Alo´s–Ferrer
(2006) shows that the properties in one of Fishburn’s characterizations are
not independent. Maniquet and Mongin (2013) study possible social wel-
fare orderings corresponding to Approval Voting and characterize them by
Arrow’s conditions when preferences are dichotomous. Finally, Masso´ and
Vorsatz (2008) and Alcalde–Unzu and Vorsatz (2009) introduce classes of vot-
ing procedures that generalize Approval Voting in natural ways. In Masso´
and Vorsatz (2008), the neutrality property is relaxed; in Alcalde–Unzu and
Vorsatz (2009), the weight of a vote is a decreasing function in the number
of approved alternatives.
One can think of Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008) and the characterization ob-
tained in Theorem 1 as dual approaches that bear important similarities.
Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008) relax neutrality and, as a result, characterize vot-
ing rules that assign diﬀerent weights to alternatives. In this paper, we
weaken the classical anonymity property and, as a consequence, weights are
assigned to voters. However, there is still one important asymmetry that
naturally occurs in the formal analysis. In Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008), the
relative weight between two alternatives can be easily determined because it
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is known from the voting rule how many votes one alternative has to receive
in order to compensate one vote to the other alternative. Yet, the construc-
tion of a weighted representation of a voting rule when anonymity is relaxed
is more complicated. This is because adding one voter to an election has the
eﬀect that the particular weight of this voter has to be determined endoge-
nously as well, and therefore, does not provide suﬃcient information of how
to determine the relative weights of the other voters. Only the additional
requirement that voters are divided into types and that there is an inﬁnite
population of potential voters of each type allows us to determine the relative
weights.
Our second characterization, Theorem 2, also relates to the literature
mentioned before. By working with a variable set of alternatives, contrary
to the majority of studies found in the literature, we can naturally impose
the property of Consistency in alternatives (which ultimately allows the de-
cision maker to go forth and back between social choice and social welfare
functions) in substitution of other properties. The only two other studies
along the same line that characterize Approval Voting are Vorsatz (2007)
and Sato (2013). The former characterizes Approval Voting in a dichoto-
mous preference setting using strategy–proofness. The latter characterizes
Approval Voting independently and simultaneously to this paper by using a
very similar set of axioms to that imposed in Theorem 2 (see the detailed
discussion in Section 3).
2 Notation and Deﬁnitions
We consider a setting with variable sets of voters and alternatives. Formally,
let 푋 be a ﬁnite set of conceivable alternatives. Generic alternatives will be
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denoted by 푥, 푦, and 푧; subsets of 푋 by 푆 and 푇 . The cardinality of 푋,
∣푋∣, is greater than or equal to 3.1 The set of feasible alternatives 퐾, the
alternatives that are actually standing for an election, is a non–empty subset
of 푋. Our analysis focuses on the idea that the individuals participating in
the election may diﬀer in their characteristics. To model this, we assume that
there is a ﬁnite set of types Θ = {1, 2, . . . , 휃} and that for each type 푡 ∈ Θ,
there is an inﬁnite number of potential voters 퐼푡. Hence, 퐼 ≡
∪
푡∈Θ 퐼푡 is the
population of all potential voters. The individuals actually participating in an
election, an electorate 푁 , is a non–empty and ﬁnite subset of the population
퐼. We will also make frequent use of the capital letters 퐴 and 퐵 to denote
electorates.
Each individual 푖 ∈ 퐼 partitions the set of alternatives 푋 into two sets:
푀푖 ∈ 2푋 and (푋∖푀푖). The interpretation is that푀푖 is the set of alternatives 푖
votes for (or approves of). Thus, we can describe the opinion of an individual
푖 by only referring to the set 푀푖. A proﬁle 푀 = (푀푖)푖∈퐼 ∈ (2푋)퐼 is a
list of all votes. Given a proﬁle 푀 and an electorate 푁 , a response proﬁle
푀푁 = (푀푖)푖∈푁 ∈ (2푋)푁 is the 푛–tuple of votes coming from the electorate 푁
at proﬁle 푀 . Given the response proﬁle 푀푁 , the number of votes 푥 receives
from the individuals of type 푡 who belong to the electorate 푁 is denoted by




푥(푀푁) is the total number of votes 푥
gets at 푀푁 .
Given a set of feasible alternatives 퐾 and an electorate 푁 , a voting rule
푣퐾,푁 : (2푋)퐼 → (2퐾 ∖ ∅) selects for all proﬁles 푀 a non–empty set of feasible
alternatives 푣퐾,푁(푀) with the property that for all 푀, 푀¯ ∈ (2푋)퐼 such that
1If there are only two conceivable alternatives, all results of the paper hold true. The
unique diﬀerence is that, when ∣푋∣ = 2, one of the axioms, Consistency in alternatives, is





퐾,푁(푀) = 푣퐾,푁(푀¯). We write 푣퐾(푀푁) instead of 푣
퐾,푁(푀).
A voting procedure {푣퐾,푁 : (2푋)퐼 → (2퐾 ∖ ∅)}퐾⊆푋,푁⊂퐼 is a family of voting
rules, one for every set of feasible alternatives 퐾 and every electorate 푁 . It is
denoted by 푣. Given the voting procedure 푣 and a set of feasible alternatives
퐾, the subfamily {푣퐾,푁 : (2푋)퐼 → (2퐾 ∖ ∅)}푁⊂퐼 is denoted by 푣퐾 .
Next, we introduce some known voting procedures in this context.
Deﬁnition 1 The voting procedure 푣 is Approval Voting if for all sets of
feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋 and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼,
푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁) if and only if 퐺푥(푀푁) ≥ 퐺푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾.
Deﬁnition 2 The voting procedure 푣 is Disapproval Voting if for all sets of
feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋 and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼,
푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁) if and only if 퐺푥(푀푁) ≤ 퐺푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾.
As we have already outlined in the Introduction, the main objective of
our study is to relax the anonymity assumption underlying Approval Voting.
One natural way to achieve this goal is to treat individuals with the same type
equally but to possibly discriminate between votes coming from individuals
of distinct types. The family we introduce next conceptualizes this idea by
assigning an exogenous (possibly diﬀerent) weight to each type.
Deﬁnition 3 The voting procedure 푣 is a Type–weighted Approval Voting if
there exists a vector of weights p = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝휃) ∈ ℝ휃++ such that for all
sets of feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋 and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼,






푝푡 ⋅퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾.
If p is such that 푝푠 = 푝푡 for all 푠, 푡 ∈ Θ, then all voters are treated equally
and the voting procedure coincides with Approval Voting.
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3 Axioms and Characterizations
In this section, we are going to present a characterization of all Type–
weighted Approval Voting procedures and a new characterization of Approval
Voting. We start by introducing several properties.
Since we allow in our analysis for variable sets of feasible alternatives and
voters, we necessarily need two consistency conditions that establish how
the selected set of alternatives adapts as either of these changes. The ﬁrst
property states that if the set of feasible alternatives is reduced and some
of the alternatives that originally were selected remain feasible, then exactly
those have to be selected in the new situation.
Consistency in alternatives: The voting procedure 푣 is consistent in
alternatives if for all feasible sets of alternatives 푆 ⊂ 푇 ⊆ 푋, all proﬁles
푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼 such that 푣푇 (푀푁) ∩ 푆 ∕= ∅,
푣푆(푀푁) = 푣
푇 (푀푁) ∩ 푆.
The property of Consistency in alternatives is important because it allows
us to reformulate the question of which alternatives to choose from each
subset of alternatives to the question of how to order all alternatives of the
universal set 푋. To say it diﬀerently, the problems of constructing a social
choice function and a social welfare function become equivalent (see, Arrow
1959). This is the reason why we can restrict our attention in the remaining
axioms to sets of feasible alternatives that only contain two alternatives.
The second consistency property, Consistency in voters, says that if two
disjoint groups of voters elect some common alternatives from the set {푥, 푦},
then exactly those alternatives have to be elected if the two groups are joined.
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This kind of property has been used in many characterizations of voting pro-
cedures and social choice functions; examples include, Smith (1973), Young
(1974), Hansson and Sahlquist (1976), Fishburn (1978), Richelson (1978),
Sertel (1988), Alo´s–Ferrer (2006), Masso´ and Vorsatz (2008), and Alcalde-
Unzu and Vorsatz (2009).
Consistency in voters: The voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters
if for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all disjoint elec-
torates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼 such that 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) ∩ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐵) ∕= ∅,
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴∪퐵) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) ∩ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐵).
To shorten our notation, we will say that a voting procedure 푣 is consistent
if it is both consistent in alternatives and consistent in voters.
Next, we will introduce three symmetry conditions. The ﬁrst one, Sym-
metry across alternatives, is the standard Neutrality condition. It states that
if alternatives are permuted, then the set of elected alternatives has to be
permuted accordingly. To introduce it formally, we need additional notation:
given a permutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋 and a pair of alternatives {푥, 푦}, let 휇(푀푁)
and 휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)) be the response proﬁle and the set of elected alternatives
permuted according to 휇.
Symmetry across alternatives: The voting procedure 푣 is symmetric
across alternatives (or neutral) if for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles
푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼, and all permutations 휇 : 푋 → 푋,
휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)) = 푣휇({푥,푦})(휇(푀푁)).
The second symmetry condition, Symmetry across types, relaxes the clas-
sical anonymity axiom according to which the result of the election should
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be invariant to permutations of voters. Here, we only require this symmetry
condition to hold true if voters of the same type are permuted. To introduce
it formally, we say that two response proﬁles 푀퐴 and 푀
′
퐵 are isomorphic
relative to {푥, 푦} if for all 푡 ∈ Θ, there is a permutation 휋푡 : 퐼푡 ∩ 퐴→ 퐼푡 ∩ 퐵
such that 푀 ′휋푡(푖) ∩ {푥, 푦} = 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦}.
Symmetry across types: The voting procedure 푣 is symmetric across
types (or type–wise anonymous) if for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 and all re-
sponse proﬁles 푀퐴 and 푀
′
퐵 that are isomorphic relative to {푥, 푦},
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀 ′퐵).
Finally, the last symmetry condition, Symmetry across voters, is the clas-
sical Anonymity axiom. To introduce it formally, we will say that two re-
sponse proﬁles 푀퐴 and 푀
′
퐵 are strongly isomorphic relative to {푥, 푦} if there
is a permutation 휋 : 퐴→ 퐵 such that 푀 ′휋(푖) ∩ {푥, 푦} = 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦}.
Symmetry across voters: The voting procedure 푣 is symmetric across
voters (or anonymous) if for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 and all response proﬁles
푀퐴 and 푀
′
퐵 that are strongly isomorphic relative to {푥, 푦},
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀 ′퐵).
To shorten our notation, we will say that a voting procedure 푣 is weakly
symmetric if it is both symmetric across alternatives and symmetric across
types. We will say that it is symmetric if it is also symmetric across voters.
To introduce the next property, Continuity, consider an inﬁnite number
of disjoint electorates such that all of them only select the same alternative
푥 from the set {푥, 푦}. Suppose also that there is another electorate 퐴, dis-
joint from the other electorates, for which 푦 is the unique alternative elected
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from the set {푥, 푦}. The idea of continuity is that if a suﬃcient number of
electorates that elect 푥 are joined together with 퐴, then alternative 푥 should
be elected (but not necessarily excluding 푦). This condition eliminates, for
example, dictatorship–like procedures that give an inﬁnite weight to some
type of voters or procedures that break ties in a lexicographic way.
Continuity: The voting procedure 푣 is continuous if for all alternatives
푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , all successions of disjoint electorates {푁푝}
such that 푣{푥,푦}(푁푝) = {푥} for all 푝 ∈ ℕ, and any other electorate 퐴 for
which 퐴 ∩ 푁푝 = ∅ for all 푝 ∈ ℕ and 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = {푦}, there exists 푘 ∈ ℕ
such that
푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푘∪퐴).
In the literature, similar conditions to Continuity are found under the
names of Archimedean Property or Overwhelming Majority; see, Smith (1973),
Young (1975), Richelson (1978), Myerson (1996), or Alcalde-Unzu and Vor-
satz (2009).2
Finally, we introduce a weak unanimity condition which establishes that
getting more votes is desirable. The following property is a weak condition
inspired by Fishburn (1978).
Faithfulness: The voting procedure 푣 is faithful if for all individuals 푖 ∈ 퐼
and all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋,
푀푖 = {푥} ⇒ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푥}.
2The main diﬀerences between this version and others are: (푖) In other stronger ver-
sions, it is imposed that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푘∪퐴) = {푥} and/or that the requirement has
to be satisﬁed also for any 푘′ > 푘; and (푖푖) other versions require that the electorates of
the sequence have to be isomorphic instead of requiring that they select the same set of
alternatives.
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Our ﬁrst and main result is a characterization of all Type-weighted Ap-
proval Voting procedures.
Theorem 1 The voting procedure 푣 is consistent, weakly symmetric, contin-
uous, and faithful if and only if it is a Type–weighted Approval Voting.
The proof that the mentioned properties imply 푣 to be a Type–weighted
Approval Voting is constructive and divided into several steps (see the Ap-
pendix). We now shortly explain the structure of the proof in order to facil-
itate its reading.
1. It is shown in Lemma 1 that consistency in voters and neutrality implies
that if one individual either approves both 푥 and 푦 or neither of the
two alternatives, then eliminating this individual from the electorate
does not aﬀect the result of the election in case 푥 and 푦 are the only
two feasible alternatives.
2. Lemma 2 shows that consistency in voters and weak symmetry implies
that if 푥 and 푦 receive the same number of votes from each type 푡 ∈ Θ,
then both alternatives have to be elected if they are the only two feasible
alternatives.
3. Lemma 3 establishes that consistency in voters, weak symmetry and
previous lemmas implies that if alternatives 푧 and 푤 receive the same
number of votes from each type 푡 ∈ Θ under the response proﬁle 푀 ′퐵 as
alternatives 푥 and 푦, respectively, under the response proﬁle 푀퐴, then
푧 (respectively, 푤) is elected from the set {푧, 푤} at 푀 ′퐵 if and only if 푥
(respectively, 푦) is elected from the set {푥, 푦} at 푀퐴.
4. We construct a binary relation ≿ over vectors (푥1, 푥2, . . . , 푥휃) ∈ ℕ휃,
interpreting each of the vectors as a possible combination of numbers
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of votes from each type. The binary relation represents which combi-
nations of votes is better than another for an alternative to be selected
by the voting procedure when there are only two alternatives standing
for election.
5. Given consistency in voters, weak symmetry, continuity and Lemma 3,
Lemma 4 proves that the triple (ℕ휃,≿,+) is a closed extensive struc-
ture.
6. Using a result in Krantz et al. (1971) about closed extensive structures,
we can deduce that the binary relation ≿ can be computed by calculat-
ing the number of weighted votes of each alternative, where the weight
of a vote depends on the type of the individual casting this vote. By
faithfulness, all these weights are strictly positive.
7. Then, combining steps 4 to 6, we deduce that the subfamily {푣퐾}∣퐾∣=2
behaves as a Type–weighted Approval Voting rule. The exact value
of the weights of each particular rule are obtained by observing in the
results of the rule how many votes one alternative has to receive to
compensate one vote for the other alternative.
8. Finally, by applying consistency in alternatives, we extend this argu-
ment to sets of alternatives of any size to show that 푣 is a Type–
weighted Approval Voting procedure.
We also show in the Appendix that the properties used in Theorem 1
are independent, separating both consistency and weak symmetry in their
respective parts.
Proposition 1 The properties in Theorem 1 are independent.
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At this point it is important to study the consequences of strengthen-
ing Symmetry across types to the classical Anonymity property (that is,
to strengthen weak symmetry to symmetry).3 Since Approval Voting is the
unique Type–weighted Approval Voting procedure that is also symmetric, we
obviously obtain a characterization of Approval Voting. However, one impor-
tant insight is that one can then, at the same time, eliminate the continuity
axiom, a fact that has been shown independently and simultaneously to this
paper by Sato (2013) using a diﬀerent proof technique.4 But one can even go
one step further as it is shown in our second theorem: if one strengthens weak
symmetry to symmetry and eliminates faithfulness together with continuity,
one still obtains essentially a characterization of Approval Voting.5 Before
introducing the result, we need to deﬁne a non–degenerate voting procedure
as a voting procedure that does not always select all available alternatives.6
Theorem 2 A non-degenerate voting procedure 푣 is consistent and symmet-
ric if and only if it is Approval Voting or Disapproval Voting.
We say that Theorem 2 is essentially a characterization of Approval Voting
because of the following reasoning: if individuals are rational, each voter 푖 ∈ 퐼
3We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for indicating this question to us.
4There are slight but non-essential diﬀerences across the two settings: (푖) Sato (2013)
deﬁnes all axioms for any possible size of the set of feasible alternatives, whereas we
deﬁne the properties for sets with only two feasible alternatives, except Consistency in
alternatives; (푖푖) Sato (2013) considers an independent property called Consistency in
ballot response proﬁles, an assumption that we included in the deﬁnition of the voting
procedure; and (푖푖푖) We impose a condition of non-degeneration in our next result that it
is not needed when faithfulness is added as a necessary axiom.
5We omit the independence of the axioms given that it is very similar to the one of
Theorem 1.
6Formally, 푣 is a non–degenerate voting procedure if there exists a set of alternatives
퐾 ⊆ 푋, a set of voters 푁 ⊂ 퐼 and a proﬁle 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 such that 푣퐾(푀푁 ) ∕= 퐾.
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will permute the sets 푀푖 and (푋 ∖푀푖) if Disapproval Voting is implemented
instead of Approval Voting. Thus, the results of the two voting procedures
are always the same for rational voters. Yet, if one wants to isolate Approval
Voting in its classical deﬁnition, an additional requirement satisﬁed by Ap-
proval but not by Disapproval Voting becomes necessary. Some possibilities
are Faithfulness (as shown by Sato, 2013), any other unanimity property, any
monotonicity condition, or even a No-Disapproval Voting axiom: a minimal
property that only eliminates Disapproval Voting from the set of possible
voting procedures.7
The proof that the mentioned properties imply 푣 to be Approval Voting
or Disapproval Voting is constructive and similar to that of Theorem 1 (see
the Appendix). In particular, step 1 is the same in both proofs, step 2 is
not necessary any further, and the remaining steps follow a similar path, but
with strong results in this case given that the set of properties is stronger.
We now shortly explain this ﬁnal part in order to facilitate the reading of
the proof.
3. Lemma 5 shows, applying Lemma 1, that under consistency and sym-
metry if alternatives 푧 and 푤 receive the same number of total votes
under the response proﬁle 푀 ′퐵 as alternatives 푥 and 푦, respectively,
under the response proﬁle 푀퐴, then 푧 (respectively, 푤) is elected from
the set {푧, 푤} at 푀퐴 if and only if 푥 (respectively, 푦) is elected from
the set {푥, 푦} at 푀 ′퐵.
4. We construct a binary relation≿ over ℕ. The binary relation represents
which number of votes is better than another for an alternative to
7This is the weakest possible axiom because it only eliminates one voting procedure
from the analysis. A similar axiom, but in a totally diﬀerent context, was proposed by
D’Aspremont and Gevers (1977) to isolate the leximin principle from the leximax one.
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be selected by the voting procedure when there are only two feasible
alternatives.
5. Lemma 6 shows, using Consistency in voters, symmetry and Lemma 5,
that ≿ corresponds with ≥, ≤ or =. Hence, the subfamily {푣퐾}∣퐾∣=2
behaves as Approval Voting (≥), as Disapproval Voting (≤) or as a
degenerate voting procedure (=).
6. Using Consistency in alternatives, we extend this argument to sets of
alternatives of any size. Thus, if 푣 is non-degenerate, it is Approval or
Disapproval Voting.
The main diﬀerence between this characterization of Approval Voting
(and the one by Sato, 2013) with respect to other known characterizations
is that we work with a variable set of alternatives instead of a ﬁxed one, as
other papers do. This fact allows, apart of the possibility of not including a
monotonicity property, to include Consistency in alternatives replacing other
axioms that are perhaps hinting too direct to the resulting voting procedure.
For example, the property of Cancellation — which requires that all alterna-
tives are elected whenever all alternatives receive the same number of votes
—, used in Fishburn (1978) and in Alo´s-Ferrer (2006), practically imposes
that only the total number of votes matter. Similarly, Baigent and Xu (1991)
and Goodin and List (2006) suggest a property that ensures that the result of
the voting procedure does not change if we permute the individual who cast
a vote for a given alternative. A ﬁnal example along this line is the property
of Disjoint Equality, considered by Fishburn (1978) and Sertel (1988), which
states that if two voters approve disjoint sets of alternatives, then the elec-
torate composed by the two voters selects the union of these two approved
sets. These axioms are well–founded, yet Consistency in alternatives — Ar-
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row’s axiom of choice, which is a necessary and suﬃcient condition so that no
information is distorted if a transitive and complete binary relation is derived
from the pairwise choices of a given social choice function and, afterwards,
the social choice function is re-derived as the top indiﬀerence class of the
derived social welfare function restricted to the set of available alternatives
— seems to us a far more basic property.
The imposition of Consistency in alternatives also allows us to directly
relate our characterization to existing results on social welfare functions.8
For example, Ju (2011) shows that if preferences are dichotomous, then all
monotonic, neutral, and anonymous social welfare orderings are acyclic and
the majority rule is the unique non–degenerate one that is transitive. Since
one can reinterpret the alternatives 푀푖 an individual 푖 votes for as the set of
good alternatives and the alternatives an individual does not vote for as the
set of bad alternatives of a dichotomous preference relation, there is an obvi-
ous equivalence between our framework and the domain restriction Ju (2011)
imposes and, therefore, between Approval Voting and the majority rule. Us-
ing this interpretation, since faithfulness and consistency in voters imply the
monotonicity condition of Ju (2011), Theorem 1 shows that there are addi-
tional transitive social welfare orderings once the anonymity assumption is
relaxed. Similarly, Theorem 2 shows that the substitution of monotonicity by
Consistency in voters also allows us to characterize essentially the majority
rule under a dichotomous domain restriction.
8We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this discussion.
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4 Conclusion
We have characterized a family of voting procedures that generalizes Ap-
proval Voting for the cases when the society agrees not to treat all voters
equally. In particular, we have shown that a voting procedure is consis-
tent, weakly symmetric, continuous, and faithful if and only if there exists a
strictly positive and ﬁnite weight for each type of voter and the alternatives
with the maximal sum of weighted votes are selected.
Since we characterize a large class of voting rules and therefore allow a
priori for a wide variety of discrimination between voters, there is the need to
discuss how the weights are ultimately determined. In particular, one needs
to identify ﬁrst the relevant characteristics of the voters. Only afterwards
one has to decide how to weigh diﬀerent voters.
In some cases of indirect democracy in which each voter represents a set
of citizens, the ﬁrst step is not controversial: the classiﬁcation should be done
in function of the number of people each voter represents. However, there is
a vast literature that discusses which weight each representative should have
as a function of her type. At a ﬁrst sight, one would think that the weights
should be proportional to the number of people each voter represents. Yet, it
has been shown that this is probably not the best voting rule. Barbera and
Jackson (2006) characterize the eﬃcient weights –the ones that maximize the
total expected utility–, which turn out to be diﬀerent from the proportional
ones. Other authors have proposed also structures of weights in basis of other
criteria such as the equality of the probability of each person to be pivotal
in the election or the equality of the expected satisfaction of each person
with the outcome. See, for example, Laruelle and Valenciano (2008) for this
strand of the literature.
In many other cases the voters only represent themselves, yet it might
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still be desirable to implement a discriminative voting rule. This is the point
where the discussion about which characteristics should determine the weight
clearly emerges. Even though it is impossible to provide a deﬁnite guideline,
one can look, for example, at elections in universities. In some of them, voters
are classiﬁed depending on their type of aﬃliation (students, administrative
staﬀ, professors, etc.); in others, the classiﬁcation is more detailed and also
considers other aspects such as seniority.
All in all, and independently of the more or less diﬃculty to deﬁne the ap-
propriate criteria to classify voters, our axiomatic study provides a theoretical
background for the use of a Type–weighted Approval Voting procedure.
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Proofs
The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 have the following lemma in common.
Lemma 1 If the voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters and neutral, then
for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼
and all voters 푖 ∈ 푁 such that 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈ {∅, {푥, 푦}},
푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁∖{푖}).
Proof: Take any two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, any proﬁle 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , any
electorate 푁 ⊂ 퐼 and any voter 푖 ∈ 푁 such that 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈ {∅, {푥, 푦}}.
We are going to show ﬁrst by contradiction that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푥, 푦}.
Suppose that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푥}. Consider the permutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋
such that 휇(푥) = 푦, 휇(푦) = 푥 and 휇(푧) = 푧 for all 푧 ∈ 푋 ∖ {푥, 푦}. Then, by
neutrality, 휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푖)) = 푣휇({푥,푦})(휇(푀푖)). Given that 휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푖)) = {푦},
that 휇({푥, 푦}) = {푥, 푦} by deﬁnition of 휇 and that 휇(푀푖) = 푀푖, we have
that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푦}. This is a contradiction. Since 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푦} can
be excluded using a similar argument and since 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) ∕= ∅ by deﬁnition,
we can conclude that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푥, 푦}. Finally, 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁∖{푖})∩{푥, 푦} ∕= ∅
implies that we can apply consistency in voters to obtain that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) =
푣{푥,푦}(푀푁∖{푖}). This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
The successive applications of Lemma 1 implies that given an electorate
푁 and any two alternatives 푥 and 푦 standing for election, it can be assumed
that all individuals belonging to 푁 vote for one and only one of these two
alternatives (voters who do not declare a strict preference between 푥 and 푦
can simply be discarded). Also note that if 푀푖 ∈ {∅, {푥, 푦}} for all 푖 ∈ 푁 ,
then both alternatives have to be elected by neutrality.
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Proof of Theorem 1
It is easy to check that all Type–weighted Approval Voting procedures satisfy
consistency, weak symmetry, continuity and faithfulness. The proof that
these properties imply 푣 to be a Type–weighted Approval Voting follows the
steps mentioned in the main text.
We ﬁrst have that Lemma 1 can be applied. Now, we establish other lemmas.
Lemma 2 If the voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters and weakly sym-
metric, then for all alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all
electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푡푥(푀푁) = 퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푡 ∈ Θ,
푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) = {푥, 푦}.
Proof: Take any two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, any proﬁle 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and any
electorate 푁 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푡푥(푀푁) = 퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푡 ∈ Θ. By Lemma
1, we can assume that 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈ {{푥}, {푦}} for all 푖 ∈ 푁 . Partition the
electorate 푁 into 휃 sub–electorates 푁1, . . . , 푁휃 in such a way that 푖 ∈ 푁푡 if
and only if 푖 ∈ 푁 ∩ 퐼푡.
Consider any type 푡 ∈ Θ for which ∣푁푡∣ > 0. We are going to show by con-
tradiction that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) = {푥, 푦}. Suppose that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) = {푥}. Take
the permutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋 such that 휇(푥) = 푦, 휇(푦) = 푥, and 휇(푧) = 푧 for
all 푧 ∈ 푋 ∖ {푥, 푦}. Then, by neutrality, 푣휇({푥,푦})(휇(푀푁푡)) = 휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡)) =
{푦}. Since 휇({푥, 푦}) = {푥, 푦} by the deﬁnition of the permutation, the former
equation can be rewritten as 푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀푁푡)) = {푦}. Now observe that 휇(푀푁푡)
is an isomorphic copy of 푀푁푡 relative to {푥, 푦} because 퐺푡푥(푀푁) = 퐺푡푦(푀푁)
by assumption. By type–wise anonymity, 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) = 푣
{푥,푦}(휇(푀푁푡)) =
{푦}, which contradicts our initial assumption that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) = {푥}. A
symmetric argument proves that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) ∕= {푦} and, therefore, we are





{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) ∕= ∅, the iterative application







푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푡) = {푥, 푦}.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
Before introducing the next lemma, let 푑푡푥,푦(푀푁) = 퐺
푡
푥(푀푁) − 퐺푡푦(푀푁)
be the diﬀerence of the number of votes of type 푡 between alternatives 푥 and
푦 at 푀푁 .
Lemma 3 If the voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters and weakly sym-
metric, then for all alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧, 푤 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀,푀 ′ ∈ (2푋)퐼 ,
and all electorates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) = 퐺푡푧(푀 ′퐵) and 퐺푡푦(푀퐴) =
퐺푡푤(푀
′
퐵) for all 푡 ∈ Θ,
푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔ 푧 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵) and 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔ 푤 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵).
Proof: Take any four alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧, 푤 ∈ 푋, any two proﬁles 푀,푀 ′ ∈
(2푋)퐼 , and any two electorates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) = 퐺푡푧(푀 ′퐵)




퐵) for all 푡 ∈ Θ. By Lemma 1, we can assume that
푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈ {{푥}, {푦}} for all 푖 ∈ 퐴 and 푀 ′푗 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈ {{푥}, {푦}} for all
푗 ∈ 퐵. Partition the electorate 퐴 into 휃 sub–electorates 퐴1, . . . , 퐴휃 in such a
way that 푖 ∈ 퐴푡 if and only if 푖 ∈ 퐴∩퐼푡. Construct the electorates 퐵1, . . . , 퐵휃
in an identical manner.
For each type 푡 ∈ Θ, partition the electorate 퐴푡 into two sub–electorates,
퐴푡1 and 퐴푡2 , in such a way that exactly ∣푑푡푥,푦(푀퐴)∣ individuals belong to 퐴푡1
and all these individuals only vote for the alternative that receives more votes
at 푀퐴; that is, for all 푖 ∈ 퐴푡1 , 푀푖∩{푥, 푦} = {푥} whenever 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) > 퐺푡푦(푀퐴)
and 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} = {푦} whenever 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) < 퐺푡푦(푀퐴) and, obviously, 퐴푡1 = ∅
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in case 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) = 퐺
푡
푦(푀퐴). Then, 퐴푡2 = 퐴푡 ∖ 퐴푡1 . The electorates 퐵푡1 and
퐵푡2 are derived from 퐵푡 in a similar fashion.
Consider the permutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋 such that 휇(푧) = 푥 and 휇(푤) = 푦.
Then, 휇(푀 ′퐵푡푗 ) and 푀퐴푡푗 are isomorphic relative to {푥, 푦} for all 푡 ∈ Θ and all
푗 ∈ {1, 2}. Summing up over all types we can see that the response proﬁles
푀퐴1 =
∑









relative to {푥, 푦}. By type–wise anonymity,
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴1) = 푣
{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵1)). (1)





) = 0 for all 푡 ∈ Θ by the








) and apply Lemma 2 to see that
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴2) = 푣
{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵2)) = {푥, 푦}. (2)
Now, apply consistency in voters together with Equations (1) and (2) to see
that 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴1∪퐴2) = 푣
{푥,푦}(푀퐴1) and that 푣
{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵)) =
푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵1∪퐵2)) = 푣
{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵1)). This, together with Equation (1), im-
plies that
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = 푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵)). (3)
Finally, consider the permutation 휇−1. By neutrality, 휇−1(푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵))) =
푣휇
−1({푥,푦})(휇−1(휇(푀 ′퐵))) = 푣
{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). This, together with Equation (3),
implies that 휇−1(푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)) = 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). Hence, 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) if and
only if 푧 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵) and 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) if and only if 푤 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). □
Consider the following binary relation ≿ deﬁned over ℕ휃 × ℕ휃: for all
(푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ∈ ℕ휃, (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) if there exists a
response proﬁle 푀푁 and two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 such that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)
and for all 푡 ∈ Θ, 퐺푡푥(푀푁) = 푥푡 and 퐺푡푦(푀푁) = 푦푡. Our objective is to show
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that the triple (ℕ휃,≿,+) is a closed extensive structure; that is, this triple
satisﬁes the following properties (see Krantz et al. 1971):
1. Complete preorder: ≿ is a complete preorder over ℕ휃 × ℕ휃.
2. Associativity: For all (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) ∈ ℕ휃, we
have that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + ((푦1, . . . , 푦휃) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) ∼ ((푥1, . . . , 푥휃) +
(푦1, . . . , 푦휃)) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃).
3. Independence: For all (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) ∈ ℕ휃, we
have that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ⇔ ((푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) ≿
((푦1, . . . , 푦휃)+(푧1, . . . , 푧휃))⇔ ((푧1, . . . , 푧휃)+(푥1, . . . , 푥휃)) ≿ ((푧1, . . . , 푧휃)+
(푦1, . . . , 푦휃)).
4. Archimedean: For all four (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) and
(푤1, . . . , 푤휃) ∈ ℕ휃, if (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≻ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), then there exists a pos-
itive integer 푡 such that (푘⋅(푥1, . . . , 푥휃)+(푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) ≿ (푘⋅(푦1, . . . , 푦휃)+
(푤1, . . . , 푤휃)).
Lemma 4 If the voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters, weakly symmetric
and continuous, the triple (ℕ휃,≿,+) is a closed extensive structure.
Proof: We show that the triple (ℕ휃,≿,+) satisﬁes the conditions of Com-
plete Preorder, Associativity, Independence, and Archimedean.
Complete Preorder: To see that the binary relation ≿ is well-deﬁned,
take any (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ∈ ℕ휃 and consider the response proﬁles
푀퐴,푀
′
퐵 together with the alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧, 푤 ∈ 푋 such that 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) =
퐺푡푧(푀
′






퐵) = 푦푡 for all 푡 ∈ Θ. We have to
establish that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔ 푧 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵) and that 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔
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푤 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). But this is exactly what we have shown in Lemma 3. Hence,
≿ is well-deﬁned.
To show that the binary relation ≿ is complete, note ﬁrst that for any
(푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ∈ ℕ휃, we can consider a response proﬁle 푀푁 and
two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 such that for all 푡 ∈ Θ, 푁 ∩ 퐼푡 consists of 푥푡
individuals voting only for alternative 푥 and 푦푡 individuals voting only for
alternative 푦. This is always possible because 퐼푡 is an inﬁnite set for all
푡 ∈ Θ. By deﬁnition of 푣, we have that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) ∈ {{푥}, {푦}, {푥, 푦}}.
Then, it follows from the deﬁnition of ≿ that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃)
and/or (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ≿ (푥1, . . . , 푥휃). Hence, ≿ is complete.
To see that≿ is transitive, take any (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) ∈
ℕ휃 such that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) and (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ≿ (푧1, . . . , 푧휃). Con-
sider any response proﬁle 푀푁 and any three alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧 ∈ 푋 such
that for all 푡 ∈ Θ, 푁 ∩ 퐼푡 consists of 푥푡 individuals voting only for al-
ternative 푥, 푦푡 individuals voting only for alternative 푦, and 푧푡 individ-
uals voting only for alternative 푧. Since (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) and
(푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ≿ (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) by assumption, the deﬁnition of ≿ implies that
푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) and 푦 ∈ 푣{푦,푧}(푀푁). Suppose that transitivity is violated;
that is, 푣{푥,푧}(푀푁) = {푧}. Then,
(a) 푥 ∕∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁). If it was the case that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁), then, by
consistency in alternatives, we would have 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푧}(푀푁). This con-
tradicts 푣{푥,푧}(푀푁) = {푧}.
(b) 푦 ∕∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁). If it was the case that 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁), then, by con-
sistency in alternatives, we would have 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁). This, together
with the assumption 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁), would imply that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) =
{푥, 푦}. Hence, by consistency in alternatives, 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁), which
contradicts case (a).
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(c) 푧 ∕∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁). If it was the case that 푧 ∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁), then, by con-
sistency in alternatives, we would have 푧 ∈ 푣{푦,푧}(푀푁). This, together
with the assumption 푦 ∈ 푣{푦,푧}(푀푁), would imply that 푣{푦,푧}(푀푁) =
{푦, 푧}. Hence, by consistency in alternatives, 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁), which
contradicts case (b).
The three cases together imply that 푣{푥,푦,푧}(푀푁) = ∅. This is not possible
by deﬁnition and, therefore, we have reached a contradiction. Consequently,
≿ is transitive. Since the binary relation ≿ is well-deﬁned, complete, and
transitive, it is a complete preorder.
Associativity: The property holds because +, the usual addition operator
on vectors, is associative.
Independence: Consider any triple (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃) ∈
ℕ휃 such that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃). Take any proﬁle 푀 , any two dis-
joint electorates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼, and any two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋 such that
for all 푡 ∈ Θ, 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) = 푥푡, 퐺푡푦(푀퐴) = 푦푡, and 퐺푡푥(푀퐵) = 퐺푡푦(푀퐵) = 푧푡.
Since (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) by assumption, the deﬁnition of ≿ implies
that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴). Also, 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐵) = {푥, 푦} by Lemma 2. By con-
sistency in voters, 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴∪퐵). Given that 퐺푡푥(푀퐴∪퐵) = 푥푡 + 푧푡
and 퐺푡푦(푀퐴∪퐵) = 푦푡 + 푧푡 for all 푡 ∈ Θ, it follows from the deﬁnition of
≿ that (푥1 + 푧1, . . . , 푥휃 + 푧휃) ≿ (푦1 + 푧1, . . . , 푦휃 + 푧휃). Hence, as desired,
((푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) ≿ ((푦1, . . . , 푦휃) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) and ((푧1, . . . , 푧휃) +
(푥1, . . . , 푥휃)) ≿ ((푧1, . . . , 푧휃) + (푦1, . . . , 푦휃)).
Archimedean: Take any (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃), (푧1, . . . , 푧휃), (푤1, . . . , 푤휃)
belonging to ℕ휃 such that (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≻ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃). Consider any proﬁle
푀 , any two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋, any electorate 퐴 ⊂ 퐼, and any succes-
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sion of disjoint electorates {푁푝}푝∈ℕ such that 퐺푡푥(푀퐴) = 푧푡, 퐺푡푦(푀퐴) = 푤푡,
푣{푥,푦}(푁푝) = {푥}, 퐴 ∩ 푁푝 = ∅, 퐺푡푥(푀푁푝) = 푥푡 and 퐺푡푦(푀푁푝) = 푦푡 for all
푝 ∈ ℕ. By continuity, there exists 푘 ∈ ℕ such that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁1∪...∪푁푘∪퐴).
Since 퐺푡푥(푀푁1∪...∪푁푘∪퐴) = 푘 ⋅ 푥푡 + 푧푡 and 퐺푡푦(푀푁1∪...∪푁푘∪퐴) = 푘 ⋅ 푦푡 + 푤푡
for all 푡 ∈ Θ, we have, as desired, that (푘 ⋅ (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + (푧1, . . . , 푧휃)) ≿
(푘 ⋅ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) + (푤1, . . . , 푤휃)). □
Since the triple (ℕ휃,≿,+) is a closed extensive structure, we can apply Theo-
rem 1 in Krantz et al. (1971) which guarantees that there exists a real-valued
function 푓 over ℕ휃 such that for all (푥1, . . . , 푥휃), (푦1, . . . , 푦휃) ∈ ℕ휃:
(i) (푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≿ (푦1, . . . , 푦휃)⇔ 푓(푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≥ 푓(푦1, . . . , 푦휃) and
(ii) 푓((푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + (푦1, . . . , 푦휃)) = 푓(푥1, . . . , 푥휃) + 푓(푦1, . . . , 푦휃).
Additionally, any other function 푔 satisﬁes conditions (푖) and (푖푖) if and only
if there exists 푡 ∈ ℝ++ such that 푔 = 푡 ⋅ 푓 .
Using this result we construct the vector of weights p = (푝1, . . . , 푝휃) by
setting 푓(1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to 푝1, 푓(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) equal to 푝2, and so forth.
Since we know from condition (ii) that 푓(푥1, . . . , 푥휃) = 푓(푥1, 0, . . . , 0) +
푓(0, 푥2, 0, . . . , 0) + . . .+ 푓(0, 0, . . . , 푥휃), we have that
푓(푥1, . . . , 푥휃) ≥ 푓(푦1, . . . , 푦휃)⇔
휃∑
푡=1




Then, it follows from condition (i) and the deﬁnition of ≿ that for all response








We also know from Faithfulness that 푝푡 > 0 for all 푡 ∈ Θ and, therefore, we
have shown that the subfamily {푣퐾}∣퐾∣=2 is a Type–weighted Approval Vot-
ing with respect to the vector of weights p = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝휃). Consequently,
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it remains to be shown that the vector of weights p = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝휃) is such
that for all sets of feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋, independently of its size, and
all response proﬁles 푀푁 ,






푝푡 ⋅퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾.
Suppose ﬁrst that 푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁). Then, by consistency in alternatives,
푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾 ∖ {푥}. Since we already know that, for all pairs
of alternatives, 푣{푥,푦} is the Type–weighted Approval Voting with respect to
p = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝휃), it has to be the case that
∑
푡∈Θ 푝푡 ⋅퐺푡푥(푀푁) ≥
∑
푡∈Θ 푝푡 ⋅
퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾.
Suppose now that
∑
푡∈Θ 푝푡 ⋅ 퐺푡푥(푀푁) ≥
∑
푡∈Θ 푝푡 ⋅ 퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈
퐾. Then, given that, for all pairs of alternatives, 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) is the Type–
weighted Approval Voting with respect to p = (푝1, 푝2, . . . , 푝휃), 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)
for all 푦 ∈ 퐾 ∖ {푥}. If there is some 푧 ∕= 푥 such that 푧 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁),
then 푣퐾(푀푁) ∩ {푥, 푧} ∕= ∅ and it follows from consistency in alternatives
that 푣{푥,푧}(푀푁) = 푣퐾(푀푁) ∩ {푥, 푧}. Since we have already seen that 푥 ∈
푣{푥,푧}(푀푁) it also has to be that 푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁). Finally, if there is no 푧 ∕= 푥
such that 푧 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁), then 푣퐾(푀푁) = {푥} because 푣퐾(푀푁) ∕= ∅. This
concludes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 1
To establish the independence of the axioms, we are going to present six
voting procedures that violate one diﬀerent axiom each and satisfy the re-
maining ﬁve properties.
Consistency in alternatives: Take any type 푡 ∈ Θ. Let the voting proce-
dure 푣 be equal to Approval Voting whenever the set of feasible alternatives
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퐾 contains exactly two alternatives; otherwise, apply the Type–weighted
Approval Voting with weights 푝푡 = 1 and 푝푠 = 2 for all types 푠 ∕= 푡. This
procedure is consistent in voters, type–wise anonymous, neutral, faithful,
and continuous. The following example shows that it is not consistent in
alternatives.
Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦, 푧} and suppose that 푖 ∈ 퐼푠 and 푗 ∈ 퐼푡. If 푀푖 = {푥}
and 푀푗 = {푦}, then 푣푋(푀{푖,푗}) = {푥} and 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) = {푥, 푦}. Since
푣푋(푀{푖,푗})∩{푥, 푦} ∕= ∅, consistency in alternatives implies that 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) =
푣푋(푀{푖,푗}) ∩ {푥, 푦} = {푥}. This contradicts that 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) = {푥, 푦}.
Consistency in voters: Let the voting procedure 푣 be equal to Approval
Voting whenever all individuals belonging to the electorate 푁 are of the same
type; otherwise select all feasible alternatives. This procedure is consistent
in alternatives, type–wise anonymous, neutral, faithful, and continuous. The
following example shows that it is not consistent in voters.
Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦} and suppose that 1 ∈ 퐼푠 and 2 ∈ 퐼푡. If 푀1 = 푀2 =
{푥}, then 푣{푥,푦}(푀1) = 푣{푥,푦}(푀2) = {푥} and 푣{푥,푦}(푀{1,2}) = {푥, 푦}. Since
푣{푥,푦}(푀1)∩푣{푥,푦}(푀2) ∕= ∅, consistency in voters implies that 푣{푥,푦}(푀{1,2}) =
{푥}. This contradicts that 푣{푥,푦}(푀{1,2}) = {푥, 푦}.
Type–wise anonymity: Assign to each individual 푖 ∈ 퐼 a weight 푝푖 greater
than a strictly positive number 휖. Also assume that 푝푖 > 푝푗 for some pair
푖, 푗 ∈ 퐼푡 for some 푡 ∈ Θ. Let the voting procedure 푣 be such that for all sets
of feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all electorates
푁 ⊂ 퐼, 푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁) if and only if
∑
푖∈푁 :푥∈푀푖 푝푖 ≥
∑
푖∈푁 :푦∈푀푖 푝푖 for all
푦 ∈ 퐾. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent in voters,
neutral, faithful, and continuous. The following example shows that it is not
type–wise anonymous.
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Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦} and 푖, 푗 ∈ 퐼푡 for some 푡 ∈ Θ such that 푝푖 > 푝푗.
If 푀푖 = {푥} and 푀푗 = {푦}, then 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) = {푥}. Now, take any
permutation 휋푡 : 퐼푡 → 퐼푡 such that 휋푡(푖) = 푗 and 휋푡(푗) = 푖. Then,
푣{푥,푦}(푀{휋푡(푖),휋푡(푗)}) = {푦}. Since type–wise anonymity implies that 푣{푥,푦}
(푀휋푡(푖),휋푡(푗)}) = 푣
{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}), this is a contradiction.
Neutrality: Assign to each alternative 푥 ∈ 푋 a strictly positive weight 푝푥.
Assume also that 푝푥 > 푝푦 for some 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋. Let the voting procedure 푣
be such that for all sets of feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈
(2푋)퐼 , and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼, 푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁) if and only if 푝푥 ⋅ 퐺푥(푀푁) ≥
푝푦 ⋅ 퐺푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾. This procedure is consistent in alternatives,
consistent in voters, type–wise anonymous, faithful and continuous. The
following example shows that it is not neutral.
Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦} and 푁 = {푖, 푗} and suppose that 푝푥 < 푝푦. If
푀푖 = {푥} and 푀푗 = {푦}, then 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) = {푦}. Now let the per-
mutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋 be such that 휇(푥) = 푦 and 휇(푦) = 푥. Then,
휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)) = {푥} and 푣휇({푥,푦})(휇(푀푁)) = {푦}. Since neutrality implies
that 휇(푣{푥,푦}(푀푁)) = 푣휇({푥,푦})(휇(푀푁)), this is a contradiction.
Faithfulness: Let the voting procedure 푣 be such that for all sets of feasi-
ble alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼,
푣퐾(푀푁) = 퐾. This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent in vot-
ers, type–wise anonymous, neutral, and continuous. The following example
shows that it is not faithful.
Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦} and 푁 = {푖}. Suppose that 푀푖 = {푥}. Then,
푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = {푥, 푦}. However, faithfulness implies that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푖) = 푀푖 ∩
{푥, 푦} = {푥}, which is a contradiction.
Continuity: Take any vector q = (푞1, 푞2, . . . , 푞휃) of strictly positive weights
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such that 푞푖 ∕= 푞푗 for some 푖, 푗 ∈ Θ. Let the voting procedure 푣 be such that
for all sets of feasible alternatives 퐾 ⊆ 푋, all proﬁles 푀 ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all
electorates 푁 ⊂ 퐼, 푥 ∈ 푣퐾(푀푁) if and only if (a) 퐺푥(푀푁) ≥ 퐺푦(푀푁) for all
푦 ∈ 퐾 and (b)∑푡∈Θ 푞푡 ⋅퐺푡푥(푀푁) ≥∑푡∈Θ 푞푡 ⋅퐺푡푦(푀푁) for all 푦 ∈ 퐾 such that
퐺푥(푀푁) = 퐺푦(푀푁). This procedure is consistent in alternatives, consistent
in voters, type–wise anonymous, neutral, and faithful. The following example
shows that it is not continuous.
Consider 푋 = {푥, 푦}, 퐼푠 = {푗푖}푖∈ℕ, 퐼푡 = {푘푖}푖∈ℕ such that 푞푠 > 푞푡. Sup-
pose that 푀푗 = {푥} for all 푗 ∈ 퐼푠 and 푀푘 = {푦} for all 푘 ∈ 퐼푡. Suppose addi-
tionally that 푀푙 = {푦} for some 푙 ∈ 퐼푡. Consider the electorates 푁푖 = {푗푖, 푘푖}
for all 푖 ∈ ℕ. By the deﬁnition of 푣, 푣{푥,푦}(푀푙) = {푦} and 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁푖) = {푥}
for all 푖 ∈ ℕ. Consequently, continuity implies that there is some 푏 ∈ ℕ such
that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푏∪{푙}). However, since 퐺푦(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푏∪{푙}) >
퐺푥(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푏∪{푙}) for all 푏 ∈ ℕ, 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁1∪푁2∪...∪푁푏∪{푙}) = {푦} for all
푏 ∈ ℕ. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2
It is easy to check that Approval and Disapproval Voting satisfy consistency
and symmetry. The proof that these properties imply 푣 to be one of these
voting procedures follows the steps mentioned in the main text.
Observe that Lemma 1 still applies. The following lemma introduces
a stronger result than that of Lemma 3, given the strengthening of weak
symmetry to symmetry.
Lemma 5 If the voting procedure 푣 is consistent in voters and symmetric,
then for all alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧, 푤 ∈ 푋, all proﬁles 푀,푀 ′ ∈ (2푋)퐼 , and all
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electorates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푥(푀퐴) = 퐺푧(푀 ′퐵) and 퐺푦(푀퐴) = 퐺푤(푀 ′퐵),
푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔ 푧 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵) and 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)⇔ 푤 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵).
Proof: Take any four alternatives 푥, 푦, 푧, 푤 ∈ 푋, any two proﬁles 푀,푀 ′ ∈
(2푋)퐼 , and any two electorates 퐴,퐵 ⊂ 퐼 such that 퐺푥(푀퐴) = 퐺푧(푀 ′퐵)
and 퐺푦(푀퐴) = 퐺푤(푀
′
퐵). By Lemma 1, we can assume that 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} ∈
{{푥}, {푦}} for all 푖 ∈ 퐴 and 푀 ′푗 ∩{푥, 푦} ∈ {{푥}, {푦}} for all 푗 ∈ 퐵. Consider
the permutation 휇 : 푋 → 푋 such that 휇(푧) = 푥 and 휇(푤) = 푦. Then, it is
easy to see that 휇(푀 ′퐵) and 푀퐴 are strongly isomorphic relative to {푥, 푦}.
Then, by anonymity,
푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) = 푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵)). (4)
Finally, consider the permutation 휇−1. By neutrality, 휇−1(푣{푥,푦}(휇(푀 ′퐵))) =
푣휇
−1({푥,푦})(휇−1(휇(푀 ′퐵))) = 푣
{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). This, together with Equation (4),
implies that 휇−1(푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴)) = 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). Hence, 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) if and
only if 푧 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵) and 푦 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀퐴) if and only if 푤 ∈ 푣{푧,푤}(푀 ′퐵). □
Now, we introduce a binary relation ≿ deﬁned over ℕ×ℕ: for all 푎, 푏 ∈ ℕ,
푎 ≿ 푏 if there exists a response proﬁle 푀푁 and two alternatives 푥, 푦 ∈ 푋
such that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁), 퐺푥(푀푁) = 푎 and 퐺푦(푀푁) = 푏.
Lemma 6 The binary relation ≿ is ≥, ≤, or =.
Proof: First, it is easy to see that, by Lemma 5, ≿ is well-deﬁned. The proof
that it is complete and transitive follows the same steps as the corresponding
proof of Theorem 1. Thus, it is omitted.
Since the binary relation ≿ is well-deﬁned, complete, and transitive, it is
a complete preorder. Now, we will show that for all 푎, 푏 ∈ ℕ, 푎 ≿ 푏 if and
only if (푎+ 1) ≿ (푏+ 1). To prove this, consider a response proﬁle 푀푁 such
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that 퐺푥(푀푁) = 푎 and 퐺푦(푀푁) = 푏 and two individuals 푖, 푗 ∈ (퐼 ∖ 푁) such
that 푀푖 ∩ {푥, 푦} = {푥} and 푀푗 ∩ {푥, 푦} = {푦}.
Assume ﬁrst that 푎 ≿ 푏. Then, by deﬁnition of ≿, we have that 푥 ∈
푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) and, by reﬂexivity of ≿, 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) = {푥, 푦}. Finally, apply
consistency in voters to see that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁∪{푖,푗}). Thus, (푎+1) ≿ (푏+1).
Similarly, assume now that (푎 + 1) ≿ (푏 + 1). Then, by deﬁnition of ≿,
we have that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁∪{푖,푗}) and, by reﬂexivity of ≿, 푣{푥,푦}(푀{푖,푗}) =
{푥, 푦}. Finally, use consistency in voters and the fact that 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁) ∕= ∅
by deﬁnition, to see that 푥 ∈ 푣{푥,푦}(푀푁). Thus, 푎 ≿ 푏.
Therefore, it is easy to see that ≿ must be ≥, ≤ or =. □
It follows from Lemma 6 and the deﬁnition of ≿ that if the subfamily
{푣퐾}∣퐾∣=2 is non–degenerate, it must be Approval or Disapproval Voting. The
proof that this also occurs independently of the size of 퐾 follows the same
steps than in the proof of Theorem 1 and is thus omitted. This concludes
the proof of the theorem.
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EU Member State Population Weight
Germany 81,757,595 29
France 64,709,480 29

























Table 1: Voting Weights in the EU Member State Council as of July 2011.
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IMF Board of Directors Percentage of Fund Weight




United Kingdom 4.30% 108,125
Belgium (Austria) 4.98% 125,221
Mexico (Venezuela) 4.65% 117,053
Netherlands (Ukraine) 4.52% 113,822
Italy (Greece) 4.26% 107,077
Singapore (Indonesia) 3.94% 99,062
China 3.82% 95,999
Australia (Korea) 3.63% 91,347
Canada (Ireland) 3.61% 90,708
Denmark (Norway) 3.39% 85,352
Lesotho (Gambia) 3.22% 81,085
Egypt (Lebanon) 3.13% 78,692
India (Sri Lanka) 2.81% 70,705
Saudi Arabia 2.81% 70,595
Brazil (Colombia) 2.79% 70,188
Switzerland (Poland) 2.78% 69,842
Russian Federation 2.36% 60,194
Iran (Morocco) 2.27% 57,092
Argentina (Chile) 1.84% 46,335
Togo (Chad) 1.55% 39,039
Table 2: Voting Weights in the Board of Directors of the IMF as of July
2011. One voter tends to represent several countries, the only exceptions are
the United States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, and
the Russian Federation. For example, Argentina is grouped with Bolivia,
Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In case the Argentinian representant is
absent, the Chilean representant replaces her/him. The exact categorization
can be consulted at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx.
40
